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Je veux que la Banque soit assez dans les mains du gouvernement et n'y 
soit pas trop. 
 
[I want the bank to be sufficiently in the hands of the government but not 






The latest generation of research into macroeconomic policy has turned from more 
technical aspects of optimal control and expectations formation to consideration of the 
policymaking institutions themselves.  More and more countries have moved towards 
greater degrees of central bank independence, including many developing economies as 
well the member countries of the European Central Bank.  What still is not generally 
settled among economists is how to measure the stance of policy and the institutional 
features of the policymaking process.  Our review encompasses many different 
measurements of policy stance and policymaking processes.  We begin with monetary 
policy in the following section after which the third section analyses central banking 
institutions.  The fourth and fifth sections turn to fiscal policy and the need to adjust 
budget balance for the state of the business cycle.  There is then a brief concluding 
section. 
 
Central Bank Reaction Functions: Assessing the Stance of Monetary 
Policy 
 
Central banks are broadly responsible for the conduct of monetary policy. As such 
economists, as well as political scientists, have long been interested in explaining how 
                                                 
1 Quoted in Elgie and Thompson (1998, p. 96) 
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these institutions behave in practice.  Reuber (1964) was perhaps the first to formally 
write down a relationship that describes how central banks respond to various 
developments in the economy, including overall economic growth and inflation; a 
relationship that came to be termed a "reaction function."  It did not take long until the 
literature expanded to take into account the political science argument that the monetary 
authority, insofar as it is under the sway of government, would also be influenced by the 
electoral cycle (cf, Willett, 1988).  Economists and political scientists went on to address 
the possibility that the partisan leanings of various governments could be another 
influence on the conduct of monetary policy (see Drazen, 2000, and references therein). 
Interest in the reaction function approach was reignited under the stagflation 
experience of the 1970s and 1980s, when poor economic performance was accompanied 
by growing unhappiness at the powerlessness of fiscal policy to deal with the malaise.  
As discussed in more detail in the next section, central banks around the world began to 
be given more statutory independence from government.  This autonomy was often 
supplemented with frameworks designed to make them more accountable.  Inflation 
targets were first introduced in New Zealand in 1989, followed shortly thereafter by 
Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom (Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen, 
1999).  Since then the movement has accelerated and inflation targeting is perhaps the 
most popular framework of monetary policy today, extending beyond the strict, mandated 
inflation targeting embraced in the European Union to the type of looser, implicit 
inflation targeting often attributed to the US Federal Reserve.  Meanwhile, as velocity 
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became more variable in the 1980s, monetary authorities around the world increasingly 
began to rely on interest rates as the principal, if not sole, instrument of monetary policy.2 
John Taylor (1993) played a key role in laying the groundwork for revived 
interest in the reaction function approach.  Whereas much of the earlier reaction function 
literature had focused on the money supply, Taylor switched the focus to interest rate 
setting and posited that Federal Reserve policy under Alan Greenspan could be 
understood in terms of the federal funds rate responding to inflation that exceeded some 
desired level and to the gap between actual and sustainable output (the “output gap”).  
This relationship, since called the "Taylor rule," became almost universally accepted as 
the shorthand explanation of how interest rates are set.  The difficulty is that the output 
gap is not observed but must be estimated and an extensive literature has emerged that 
focuses exclusively on the tricky problem of measuring the output gap (cf, Orphanides 
and van Norden, 2002).  US studies typically impose Taylor’s belief that the Fed has a 
long-range inflation objective of 2% and will react whenever it is above or below that 
value. 
While the Taylor rule has emerged as an apt description of the forces that guide 
monetary policy, it was originally intended simply to capture the essence of Federal 
Reserve policymaking under Alan Greenspan so it should not be taken as something that 
all central banks, or even all US Federal Reserve chairmen, will maintain (Poole, 2006).  
Meanwhile, Taylor’s additional assumption that, whenever inflation exceeds its desired 
value of 2%, the Fed increases the nominal interest rate more than in proportion to the 
rise in inflation has become known as the Taylor principle (Taylor, 1998).  The reaction 
to the output gap seems consistent with the notion that the Fed cares about both real 
                                                 
2 The evolution of central bank policies is described and assessed in Siklos (2002). 
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economic developments and inflationary developments.  Despite its Greenspan-specific 
origins, it did not take long for economists to find the Taylor rule an appealing vehicle for 
understanding central bank behaviour more generally.  This led to a veritable explosion in 
the reaction function literature (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1999) while the Taylor rule 
came to be used both positively to estimate how central banks actually behave and 
normatively to recommend how they should behave. 
 Many extensions and variations to the original Taylor rule have been seen amidst 
a seemingly ever-growing set of applications around the world (see, for example, Siklos 
and Wohar, 2006; Siklos and Bohl, 2009; and references therein).  Whereas Taylor’s 
original rule has the central bank reacting contemporaneously to inflation and the output 
gap, this is somewhat inconsistent with the notion that central banks set policy rates today 
based on their expectations of future inflation and output gap levels.  Forecasts of 
inflation and the output gap, preferably the central bank’s own forecast, can be employed 
instead (see also Svensson, 2003).  Meanwhile, with central banks widely viewed as 
reacting cautiously, if only because the future is uncertain and both the reputation and the 
credibility of the central bank might be adversely affected by an unduly hasty response, 
interest rate changes are likely to be gradual and spread out over time (Sack and Wieland, 
2000).  In addition to examining whether the Taylor rule could be representative of the 
conduct of monetary policy in other countries, many researchers have considered whether 
other variables such as the exchange rate or asset prices (like housing or equity prices) 
might also influence interest setting behaviour.  Most recently, deviations from the Taylor 
rule have been linked to the surge in US housing prices in the lead in to the sub-prime 
crisis that erupted in 2007-2008 (Taylor, 2010). 
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 For countries such as the People’s Republic of China, where policy has focused 
more on money growth rates and interest rates remain less than fully market determined, 
the less-well-known “McCallum rule” (see, for example, McCallum, 1999) can be used 
to yield analogous insights into monetary policymaking (Burdekin and Siklos, 2008).3  
This McCallum rule, which relates monetary aggregates to the GDP gap and velocity 
growth, may also be more applicable to deflationary situations like Japan’s where interest 
rates are already very low.  In such cases the Taylor rule may call for interest rate cuts 
that are infeasible in practice owing to the zero interest rate lower bound.  Such a 
scenario has, of course, emerged on a much more widespread basis following the 2007-
2008 global financial crisis, with the accompanying shift to quantitative easing persisting 
at least into 2011 in the US case.4  It will be interesting to see how reaction function 
estimation takes into account the period of zero interest rate policy by the Federal 
Reserve and whether this will indeed imply more appeal to the McCallum rule over the 
more familiar Taylor rule approach. 
  
Measuring Monetary Institutions and Central Bank Independence 
 
Central bank independence is regarded as one possible solution to the time-inconsistency 
problem of monetary policy.  Rogoff (1985) demonstrated that delegation of monetary 
policy to a more inflation averse, independent central banker – one who could not be 
overruled later by the delegator – should theoretically lead to better inflation outcomes.  
                                                 
3 See also Burdekin (2008, chapter 4). 
4 Both Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro (2010) and Svensson (2010) argue that the financial crisis has 
further highlighted the importance of having fiscal policy work in conjunction with monetary policy – with 
Svensson (2010) also arguing that inflation expectations generated via a combination of extended low 
policy rates and quantitative easing can help boost output even in a very low interest rate environment. 
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This should also help keep interest rates down insofar as investors no longer demand an 
extra premium to compensate for the erosion of principal by inflation over the term of the 
loan.  Napoleon Bonaparte himself initially favoured establishing a privately-owned 
Banque de France because he reasoned that increased investor confidence would help 
keep interest rates and borrowing costs low (Elgie and Thompson, 1998, p. 98).  When 
liquidity problems emerged in 1805-1806, however, Bonaparte swiftly reformed the bank 
by executive fiat, with the governor and vice-governors henceforth being appointed by 
the head of state.  This was an early reminder, as later seen in Canada during the 
infamous "Coyne affair" at the beginning of the 1960s (Siklos, 2010), that autonomy can 
always, in reality, be reversed and that even the most statutorily independent central bank 
remains potentially vulnerable. 
 In addition to producing less inflationary outcomes, an independent central bank 
could also provide for more consistent policy and reduced uncertainty through having the 
same policymaking body span the administrations of different political parties.  Central 
bank independence can, of course, be combined with other ways of anchoring policy, 
such as the increasingly popular device of inflation targeting.5  Whereas the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand Act 1989 established an inflation target without statutory central 
bank independence, the European Central Bank, for example, combines formal 
independence from government with a clearly defined inflation target.  It is surely not 
coincidental that the decline in world inflation since the 1980s has been accompanied by 
                                                 
5 In a number of cases, such as in Latin America, moves toward central bank independence and inflation 
targeting essentially supplanted the prior alternative anchor of exchange rate targeting (Cukierman, 2008).    
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both more widespread adoption of inflation targets and by higher central bank 
independence in the industrial and developing world alike.6  
The first attempts at measuring central bank independence were by Bade and 
Parkin (BP, 1987) and by Banaian, Laney, and Willett (BLW, 1983).7  BP use three 
dimensions of central bank structure to divide central banks into four classes.  The most 
independent central banks enjoyed final authority over monetary policymaking, had no 
government official on their governing board and had some board appointments that were 
independent of government.  Only the German Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank 
met all these standards.  BP found both the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan to 
meet two of the three criteria and grouped them in the next, intermediate category of 
central bank independence.  BLW argued that the Federal Reserve is closer to the Swiss 
and German central banks.  Because the Federal Open Market Committee includes five 
Fed district presidents that are appointed by private directors, they argue, there are some 
appointments independent of government.  BLW treated independence as binary – only 
Switzerland, West Germany and the United States had independent central banks, and 
there was no attempt to assess how much less-than-independent the others were. 
 Alesina (1989) marginally extended BP’s coverage and introduced a fourth 
criterion to determine whether the monetary authority could resist fiscal pressures to 
monetize debt.  If the central bank is required to absorb the excess supply of Treasury 
bills issued by the fiscal authority, inflation may result even if the central bank has 
                                                 
6 See Crowe and Meade (2007) and Cukierman (2008) on this generalized move towards greater 
independence; while Gutiérrez (2004) assesses the substantial constitutional moves towards greater 
independence in Latin America and the Caribbean in the late 1980s and 1990s. 
7 For an earlier published version of the BP approach, see also Parkin and Bade (1978).  
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autonomy otherwise and prefers a lower inflation rate.8  Later measures added on still 
more institutional features.  The Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) index (GMT). 
for example, is a summation of eight features, each equally weighted.  Their approach 
highlighted disagreement in interpretation of central bank laws and how some criteria 
were written.  In the former category, GMT judged that the Nederlandsche Bank had final 
authority over monetary policy, while BP did not.9  In the latter category, GMT insisted 
that every member of the central bank board had to be appointed outside the government 
to achieve greater independence, whereas BP argued that only some independent 
governors or directors were needed. 
The most popular of the central bank independence measures is that of 
Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (CWN, 1992).  It is additive like GMT, but allows for a 
much richer set of possible institutional arrangements along a variety of scales, 
eventually considering seventeen different legal attributes.  Some of them are measured 
on two- or three-point scales, others on as high as a seven-point scale.  They are then 
added, sometimes in an unweighted average and other times in a weighted average 
(termed LVAU and LVAW, respectively).  CWN’s measures are therefore not cardinal in 
the manner of the earlier indices.  CWN’s methodology has been imitated by a number of 
papers since, including Cukierman, Miller, and Neyapti’s (2002) coding for the transition 
economies and Jácome and Vázquez's (2008) examination of the Latin American and 
                                                 
8 It is hard to accept Alesina's claim that Banca d’Italia’s 1981 “divorzio” from a pledge to buy bills issued 
by the Italian Treasury made it more independent than even the Federal Reserve, however.  Schaling (1995, 
p. 79) argues that such ad hoc overweighting of the bills monetization criterion means that Alesina's 
analysis fails to “qualify as ‘indices’ of central bank independence.” 
9 Banaian, Burdekin, and Willett (1995) argue that the requirement that the Dutch government must 
publicly declare its decision to override monetary policy decisions of the Nederlandsche Bank gave it much 
more independence than other central banks nearby on the BP rankings. 
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Caribbean economies.10  The CWN approach is not without its critics, however, with 
Banaian and Luksetich (2001) showing that only certain elements on the CWN scale are 
useful in reducing inflation.  Meanwhile, Banaian, Burdekin, and Willett (1998) point out 
that the arbitrary summation method used in CWN does not stand up to scrutiny using 
principal components analysis.  Indeed, the single factor concerning who has final 
authority over monetary policy accounts for most of the variation in the seventeen 
measures, implying that the other myriad factors may not contribute much additional 
explanatory power. 
 It is widely agreed that no matter how one measures the legal autonomy of a 
central bank, the practice of central bank independence may differ.  CWN offer an 
additional measure focusing on the turnover of the central bank governor.  High degrees 
of turnover (relative perhaps to some "normal" level) are seen as undue interference in 
the activities of the central bank.  CWN offer evidence that higher rates of turnover are 
correlated with higher rates of inflation.  Walsh (2005) posits, however, that this may be a 
case of reverse causality – governors who are unable to keep inflation under control will 
be held responsible and get the sack.  This is part of a broader debate concerning whether 
the overall relationship between institutional independence and inflation rate itself 
involves such reverse causation.  While the effect of national preferences simultaneously 
producing both low inflation rates and independent central banks remains largely 
unquantifiable, Brumm (2011) does find evidence of two-way causality consistent with 
inflation and central bank independence being jointly determined.11 
                                                 
10 See also Arnone, Laurens, Segalotto and Sommer (2009) for a broad-based application of both the GMT 
and CWN approaches to 163 central banks updated through the end of 2003. 
11 Meanwhile, Hayo and Hefeker (2010) review the potential role played by such factors as varying 
national inflation cultures, political interest groups, and divergent legal and political systems. 
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 Central bank independence, unmeasured twenty-five years ago and practiced in 
no more than a handful of industrialized countries, now exists in many more places and in 
nations much different from Germany or Switzerland.  Independent central banks 
emerged in Mexico and Chile, for example, as well as in many of the successor states of 
the former Soviet Union.  The relationship between central bank independence and 
inflation consistently seen in earlier studies for the industrialized economies (including 
BLW; BP; GMT; Cukierman, 1992; and Alesina and Summers, 1993) is not so clear in 
post-2000 data, however (Crowe and Meade, 2007).  One explanation for this is that, just 
as more widespread central bank independence has been accompanied by a global decline 
in inflation, the greatly reduced variation in inflation rates may make the effects of 
different institutional structures harder to identify empirically.  At the same time, the 
prior belief that effects of central bank independence on inflation were weaker in 
developing economies (e.g., CWN) has been supplanted by evidence in favour of such a 
relationship outside the more industrialized nations (Gutiérrez, 2004; Brumm, 2006; 
Jácome and Vázquez, 2008). 
 Given that there is not yet, nor likely ever will be, complete consensus as to the 
measurement of independence based on legal structures, a recent development has 
involved efforts to assess independence based on actual inflation performance.  Siklos 
(2008), for example, examines which central bank characteristics were most important 
for inflation performance for a broad range of countries over the 1990-2004 period.  The 
results point to the importance of considering both de facto and de jure aspects of 
independence.12  Meanwhile, Alpando and Honig (2010) construct a purely de facto 
                                                 
12 In addition to central bank independence, there has been an expanding literature devoted to the impact of 
rising central bank transparency, which includes dissemination of information about central bank goals, 
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ranking of central bank independence based on the degree to which observed monetary 
policy moves coincide with the electoral cycle.  Traditional measures of central bank 
independence do themselves appear to be linked to the prevalence of political monetary 
cycles under this approach, with Alpando and Honig (2009) finding that evidence of such 
cycles is essentially confined to developing countries that do not possess statutorily 
independent central banks. 
 In the face of the expansionary fiscal policies adopted by many countries 
following the global finance crisis, another question considers whether central bank 
independence might be threatened by "unpleasant monetarist arithmetic" forcing 
monetary finance of otherwise unsustainable budget deficits (Sargent and Wallace, 1981).  
The threat of fiscal dominance is minimized when the outstanding public debt is fully 
backed by current and future primary budget surpluses without any prospective reliance 
upon seigniorage revenue.  De Resende (2007) finds that the actual degree of fiscal 
dominance is low for almost all OECD countries but is more of a concern amongst 
developing economies.  Fiscal dominance threatens not only effective central bank 
independence but also the scope for achieving inflation targets insofar as the central bank 
loses control over the size of its own balance sheet (Freedman and Ötker-Robe, 2010).  
Walsh (2011, p. 19) further states: "Without fiscal acceptance of the goals of low and 
stable inflation, the central bank will ultimately fail, regardless of its supposed degree of 
operational independence."  In the US case, the degree of collaboration with the 
government and the extraordinary funding initiatives undertaken by the Federal Reserve 
                                                                                                                                                 
procedures, policy decisions and implementation issues.  While empirical testing has identified beneficial 
effects of this transparency, there appears to still be room for improvement in the degrees of economic and 
political transparency so far achieved by the major central banks (see Cruijsen and Eijffinger, 2010, for a 
survey). 
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since 2008 raise further concerns regarding whether there has been some lasting change 
in the degree of effective central bank independence.  While the ultimate implications 
remain unclear at this point, Goodfriend (2011, p. 3) emphasizes that "an independent 
central bank cannot be relied upon to deliver or decide upon the delivery of fiscal support 
for the financial system"  
 
Fiscal Policy:  Flexibility vs. Discipline 
 
Whenever the government’s budget deficit increases, it must be funded by some 
combination of money issue and bond issue.  So long as a ready market for its debt exists, 
bond-financed deficits offer a means for the government to boost the economy through 
fiscal policy alone, however.  The first large-scale adaptation of such a policy took place 
in the 1930s and was famously advocated by John Maynard Keynes (1936) as a means by 
which government policy could bring about recovery from the Great Depression by 
sacrificing the goal of a balanced budget for the good of the economy.  Since declines in 
output imply a similar decline in income taxes and sales taxes, falling tax revenues tend 
to automatically push the budget into deficit during economic downturns.  Adding to this 
automatic movement into deficit is higher government spending on unemployment and 
welfare benefits as the numbers unemployed rise in the face of lower economic activity. 
Balancing the budget under these conditions would require raising taxes or cutting 
government expenditure as the economy weakens.  Whereas the deficits generated in 
times of economic weakness should, in theory, be balanced by surpluses that 
automatically emerge as the economy strengthens, Keynes had advocated augmenting 
these “automatic stabilizer” effects with discretionary cuts in tax rates and new 
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government spending programs.  Such expanded levels of government largesse have 
proven hard to reverse politically – given that tax cuts tend to be rather more popular than 
tax hikes while expenditure increases always benefit someone and cutbacks always hurt 
someone.  The near-continuous US budget deficits in the postwar era, therefore, while not 
actually consistent with Keynes’ economic policy recommendations, emerged as a 
political legacy when the freedom for discretionary “demand management” was 
combined with the realities of the electoral process (Buchanan and Wagner, 1977). 
 Deficits have also been encouraged by the relatively short-time horizons 
inevitable under a political system that gives most political parties the expectation of only 
a limited time in power before being succeeded by the opposition.  In addition to creating 
incentives to expand prior to an election (cf, Drazen, 2001), the party in power may well 
tend to borrow more than they otherwise would so as to constrain the scope for new 
spending by their successors (cf, Persson and Svensson, 1989).  Governmental systems 
where tax and spending powers are somewhat divided, as in the US case, may add an 
extra ingredient to the expansionary bias.  For example, the burgeoning Reagan deficits 
that reached 6% of GDP in 1983 occurred as the president pushed for tax cuts while 
congress resisted government spending cuts, a stratagem that Sargent (1986) argues may 
have represented a deliberate attempt by the executive branch to essentially force 
spending cuts on congress by presenting them with huge deficits as the price of inaction. 
Imposing rigid fiscal rules that mandate a continuously balanced budget would, as 
in the 1930s, force the government to undertake contractionary policies when the 
economy weakens.  On the other hand, the postwar experience as a whole suggests a need 
for constraining deficits that are neither the result of temporary weakness in the economy 
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or other extreme events such as wartime exigencies.  This gives a certain appeal to 
focusing on the cyclically adjusted budget deficit.  Constraining the cyclically adjusted 
deficit would still allow the automatic stabilizers to function in the face of recession but 
preclude the discretionary increases in spending programs and tax cutting that have been 
so hard to reverse in practice.  Cyclically adjusted deficit rules, while theoretically more 
desirable, remain less transparent that absolute constraints, however.  Moreover, 
cyclically adjusted data series have been subject to such substantial revision that it is 
unclear that they can be used as a reliable basis for real time decision making (Hughes 
Hallett, Kattai, and Lewis, 2007).  Whereas absolute deficit limits and/or debt limits have 
been widely imposed, as in Europe and the United States, the enforceability of such well 
intended discipline devices was being very much put to the test in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis. 
As discussed earlier, fiscal discipline, however achieved, has important 
implications for the feasibility of monetary discipline as well.  Sargent and Wallace's 
(1981) model shows how sustained, long-term deficit growth implies an ever-increasing 
stock of outstanding government debt that, if never to be paid off through future taxes, 
must eventually exhaust the demand for such debt and require the central bank to 
purchase the debt – with severe inflationary consequences.   This theoretical possibility 
hits uncomfortably close to home today.  Earlier on, concern with this issue led a number 
of countries, such as Chile and Mexico, to establish independent central banks only after 
their budgets deficits had been reined in.  New monetary regimes focused on inflation 
targeting were also supplemented by the imposition of fiscal rules calling for the 
achievement of fiscal stability – with Chile, for example, mandating a 1% structural 
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surplus (Wyplosz, 2005).  In New Zealand’s case, the budget deficit was shrunk from 7% 
of GDP in 1984 to 2% of GDP in 1989 when the Federal Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
Act established the Reserve Bank’s new focus on inflation control – and was followed by 
the Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 that provided for running budgetary surpluses to pay 
off the debt built up by loose fiscal policies in the past (Burdekin and Langdana, 1995). 
Even prior to the global financial crisis, the difficulties in establishing enforceable 
fiscal rules were highlighted by the way in which the deficit limits mandated by the 
European Union's Growth and Stability Pact were being exceeded in Germany and 
elsewhere.  It is thus encouraging that there is some evidence suggesting that establishing 
monetary discipline may itself exert beneficial effects on fiscal discipline.  Burdekin and 
Laney (1988) found that countries with more independent central banks, on average, had 
lower budget deficits as well as lower inflation rates.  Although this evidence was based 
on a sample that included only three countries classified as having independent central 
banks (Germany, Switzerland and the United States), it is consistent with the premise that 
governments that cannot count on monetary accommodation of their budget deficits will 
be less inclined to run such deficits because of the higher interest rates likely to arise 
under purely bond financing.  Similarly, Tapsoba (2010) finds that another form of 
monetary discipline, inflation targeting, had favourable effects on fiscal discipline among 
developing economies (but not industrialized economies) based on a sample of 22 
inflation targeters and 36 non-inflation targeters over the 1980-2003 period.  In this case, 
central bank independence was also found to significantly augment the effects on fiscal 
discipline arising from inflation targeting.  There seems to be at least some promise, 
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therefore, that improved monetary frameworks may offer a tractable way on induce better 
fiscal outcomes as well. 
 
Assessing Fiscal Institutions: Problems and Means of Improvement 
 
The way policymakers decide the budget can itself lead to certain recurring problems.  
The first is known as the common pool resource (CPR) problem.  Policy-makers may 
consider the full benefits of their spending decisions but only part of the overall tax cost, 
as in Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnson’s (1981) model for the US Congress with members 
of Congress representing only the fiscal interests of their own district.  The second is a 
principal-agent problem.  Voters delegate power to elected officials, and they in turn 
delegate power to bureaucrats, but with obvious problems when the “principal” wants 
something different than the “agent.”  The third problem is moral hazard, which arises 
mostly in places with multiple levels of government.  The way that governments make 
budgets can alleviate or exacerbate each of the problems. 
 There are several proposed institutional solutions to the CPR problem.  One idea 
is to have actors vote on the aggregate spending total before voting on individual budgets. 
This “top-down” practice is meant to force actors to consider explicit tradeoffs  that they 
may not consider when they engage in a “bottom-up” process.  A related idea is to set 
explicit limits, or targets, on what the government can do on the budget.  The constraints 
appear often in constitutions to limit the size of spending, the deficit, and/or debt.  Forty 
of fifty American states, for example, have some form of a balanced budget requirement 
(Poterba and Rueben, 2001; Bohn and Inman, 1996).  Switzerland similarly has canton-
level “debt brakes” (Feld and Kirchgässner, 2005).  Meanwhile, the European Union’s 
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“Stability and Growth Pact” set out an expectation that no EU country should have a 
general government deficit above 3% of GDP other than under exceptional 
circumstances. 
 As discussed earlier, such hard fiscal rules are considerably more problematic 
than monetary rules, however, not just because of the danger of being too restrictive and 
preventing the operation of automatic stabilizers, but also because of enforceability.  
Monetary rules can be imposed on a separate monetary authority, leaving the 
government, at least in theory, able to discipline a central bank that fails to measure up to 
the required standards.13  Fiscal rules are essentially imposed by governments upon 
themselves and Wyplosz (2005) argues that the more ambitious, and likely politically 
impossible, step of appointing an independent Fiscal Policy Committee would be 
required for meaningful fiscal constraint.14  Other approaches focus on ways to get the 
actors to internalize the full tax externality through the decision-making process itself.  
Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen (2009), for example, propose that the players agree 
ex ante to a detailed fiscal contract that sets fiscal targets in all dimensions of the budget 
at the beginning of the process. Rather than serve as advocates for specific constituencies, 
ministers then become managers of a budget that has already been decided. 
With regard to the principal-agent problem between, and among, populations, 
elected representatives, and bureaucrats, the best remedy would seem to be the provision 
of more complete information on what the government is doing.  The institutional 
                                                 
13 Although even this enforcement may be questionable in practice with, for example, Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand Governor Donald Brash retaining his position despite breaching the upper bound of the 
agreed inflation target. 
14 Empirical analysis of the impact of existing fiscal rules is rather handicapped by the fact that countries 
adopting harder formal fiscal rules tend to be same countries that already had above-average fiscal 
discipline – just as countries have often been seen to adopt inflation targeting only when the most serious 
inflation had already been wrung out of the system. 
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implication is to adopt practices that increase the transparency of the budget process, with 
Alt and Lassen (2006) offering some empirical support for countries with more 
transparent fiscal institutions enjoying lower average debt levels.  Moral hazard, whereby 
a government spends, and borrows, more if it thinks that someone will bail it out is 
undoubtedly the issue looming largest today, however.  In the past, this typically just 
involved regional governments counting on the national government to assume their 
debts (as in the Italian case examined by Bordignon, 2000).  An institutional solution to 
this problem can be engineered through ending any possibility of a bailout either through 
banning sub-national governments from running deficits at all, as in Sweden, or through 
preventing local governments from borrowing more than they will spend on investment 
in a given year, as in the German case.  As the situation with Greece demonstrated all too 
vividly in 2011, such remedies are much harder, if not impossible, to enforce when the 
bail out is sought by a national government with full political autonomy rather than a 
local element within a single country. 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper we have limited ourselves to assessing prevailing monetary and fiscal policy 
settings and the potential benefits arising from such institutions as central bank 
independence.  This, of course, begs the question of just why governments and society 
choose the institutional features we observe.  There is clearly scope for more political 
economy analysis examining the role of government structures in producing the varying 
outcomes seen across countries (cf, Hallerberg, 2002; Hallerberg, Strauch and von 
Hagen, 2009).  What we have shown in this review is that fiscal and monetary rules, and 
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economists’ understanding of them, have changed substantially over the years.  While on 
one level there is greater consensus, there have been new questions raised in the process 
that leave plenty of room for further ongoing research in these key policy areas.
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